Why I'm Exiting DEUS at TGE: When Sophisticated Structure Meets Questionable Economics
A critical analysis of XMAQUINA's three-entity legal framework and why governance rights ≠ ownership. After reading their own documentation, I'm selling at Token Generation Event.
A Note Before We Begin
This piece is not FUD. I'm not trying to expose anyone or damage the project. When I asked questions in the XMAQUINA community, I was told to check the documentation. So that's exactly what I did. Everything you'll read here is based on what I found in XMAQUINA's own legal documents and public materials.
I genuinely hope, for everyone's sake, that the project founders aren't trying to rug anybody. Mauricio and everyone I've interacted with seem like nice people. But I'm not going to invest a lot in trusting anyone in crypto, period. I consider that prudent risk management.
That said, I do think the marketing is misleading in some important ways, and I wanted to document what I found. Going forward, I'll be looking for actual exposure to robotics companies rather than another layer of tokenization. The experience has been instructive, and the core idea of democratizing access to private equity remains compelling.
With that context, here's what I discovered when I actually read the terms and conditions.
The Appeal (And Why I Bought In)
Let me start by saying this: XMAQUINA has exceptional branding. The aesthetic is pristine. The narrative is a decentralized robotics investment DAO using Web3 to democratize access to advanced automation companies. It's compelling. The team presents professionally, the community is engaged, and the vision resonates deeply with anyone excited about the intersection of physical AI and blockchain.
I participated in the Genesis auctions. I believed in the thesis. The materials suggested an opportunity to gain exposure to a portfolio of robotics companies through a tokenized investment vehicle.
But after thoroughly reviewing the Genesis Auction Terms & Conditions, I'm selling at Token Generation Event (TGE). The legal and economic structure makes DEUS fundamentally unsuitable as an investment vehicle, despite the marketing suggesting otherwise.
The Central Problem: Zero Ownership Rights
Here's what the marketing implies: DEUS token holders are investing in a DAO treasury that will acquire equity stakes in robotics companies, and token holders will benefit as those investments appreciate.
Here's what the legal documents actually say: DEUS token holders own nothing except governance voting rights.
The Most Explicit Disclaimer: Section 7j
Before we even get to the infamous Section 20b, the Terms & Conditions state unambiguously in Section 7j:
"Tokens do not grant ownership, shares, securities, revenue rights, intellectual property, or any other form of participation in us, Affiliates, or the Projects."
The tokens are further described as "non-redeemable, non-repurchasable" and "do not entitle you to returns, passive income, interest, or similar benefits."
This language directly negates every ownership claim in the marketing materials. It is not boilerplate.
The Smoking Gun: Section 20b
Buried in the Terms & Conditions is perhaps the most important paragraph in the entire document:
"The terms 'investment', 'investor' and other similar terms, as may be used in the Materials, if any, are not meant to be interpreted literally. Rather, such terms are being used to draw rough, fuzzy-logic analogies between the heavily automated and mostly deterministic operations of decentralised smart-contracts and the discretionary performance of traditional off-chain transactions by people. When using smart-contracts, there are no legal agreements, promises of payment, or courts of law, and therefore there are no investments or other traditional transactions involved."
Read that again. They explicitly disclaim that purchasing DEUS constitutes an investment in any traditional sense. The language used throughout their marketing materials ("investment," "portfolio," "treasury allocation") is, by their own legal admission, fuzzy analogy rather than literal description.
What You Actually Own
According to the Terms & Conditions, you own a governance token on the Peaq blockchain with voting rights over proposals. You do not own any portion of the DAO treasury, any equity stake in robotics companies the DAO invests in, any enforceable claim to distributions from successful exits, or any fiduciary relationship with the entity managing the assets.
The Legal Structure: A Three-Entity Shell Game
The actual legal structure is more complex than initial documentation suggests, involving three separate entities.
The first is the XMAQUINA Foundation, a Cayman Islands Foundation Company registered under the Foundation Companies Act 2017. It holds and manages intellectual property, is the entity referenced in the website Terms & Conditions, and is formally "subordinated to the Machine DAO" per documentation.
The second is the Machine DAO, a planned non-profit DAO LLC through Aurum Law's DAOBox framework, organized in the MI jurisdiction. Because it is non-profit, there are no tax obligations on income or earnings and no distributions to members. Token holders are recognized as "members" but explicitly cannot receive profit distributions. This entity may not yet be fully registered, as documentation describes it as "planned."
The third is RWA Robotics LTD, a British Virgin Islands company that operates rwarobotics.ai. Its relationship to treasury ownership remains unclear from public documentation, and exact registration details are unverifiable without a paid BVI registry search.
From the Genesis Auction Terms & Conditions definitions:
"we", "us", "our" means RWA Robotics LTD, a company established under the laws of the British Virgin Islands which is the issuer (minter) of the Token."
Here's the critical architecture: one or more of these entities legally owns the treasury and any equity stakes in robotics companies. DEUS token holders can vote on governance proposals. None of these entities has legal obligations to follow those votes (Section 8g limits explicit obligations to delivering tokens). Treasury control currently sits in a Gnosis Safe multi-sig (estimated 4-of-7) held by the founding team during the 24-month "formation period." And the DAO itself is a non-profit structure where members explicitly cannot receive distributions.
Who Actually Owns the Assets?
The documentation deliberately obscures this. The Foundation "holds intellectual property," the DAO is structured as non-profit with no member distributions, and RWA Robotics LTD's ownership structure is undisclosed.
What's clear: DEUS holders vote on suggestions about assets they don't own, managed by entities that owe them no fiduciary duty, under a non-profit structure that explicitly prohibits member distributions.
The Disclaimer Catalog: What They're Telling You
The Terms & Conditions contain an extraordinary series of disclaimers that, when read carefully, reveal exactly what you're getting.
Section 7j is the nuclear disclaimer. Tokens "do not grant ownership, shares, securities, revenue rights, intellectual property, or any form of participation" in XMAQUINA or its affiliates. This is unambiguous: you own nothing except the token itself, which is further described as "non-redeemable, non-repurchasable" with no entitlement to "returns, passive income, interest, or similar benefits."
Section 8f disclaims any fiduciary relationship. "To the maximum extent permitted by the applicable law, we shall owe no fiduciary duties to you." They have no legal obligation to act in your financial interest or protect any "stake" you think you have.
Section 8e disclaims any broker or fund manager relationship. "We are not your broker, fund manager, or any intermediary to any broker or fund manager." Despite running what appears to be an investment fund, they explicitly disclaim providing fund management services.
Section 8g defines explicit obligations narrowly. The T&C "create and place no obligation on us or other Xmaquina Parties other than those expressly outlined herein and directly relating to the sale of Tokens." Their sole obligation is to deliver the tokens to your wallet. After TGE, they could theoretically shut everything down and owe you nothing.
Section 8a disclaims all warranties. "There are no warranties of any kind... we do not guarantee that participation in the Genesis Auction will be a good experience, meet your expectations, fit for a particular purpose or be beneficial, profitable, or suitable to you." They make no representation that this will be profitable or even functional.
Section 13c caps liability at an absurdly low threshold: "the total liability of the Xmaquina Parties... will not exceed one hundred (100) U.S. dollars or the sums paid by you to us in the Genesis Auction, whichever is greater." If you purchased $10,000 worth of DEUS and the project collapses due to mismanagement or breach, your maximum recovery is $100. The Genesis Auction raised millions, but total liability to all participants combined is capped at a three-figure sum.
Section 7g clarifies that governance votes aren't binding. "All decisions and actions regarding the Projects...including the treasury management, are generally made through governance votes. These decisions are not based on the specific goals or risk tolerance of individual MachineDAO members...and do not constitute personalised recommendations." Your governance votes are community suggestions the controlling entities can disregard without consequence.
The Value Accrual Problem
In traditional equity or even in well-structured crypto protocols, there are clear mechanisms for value accrual. Equity provides ownership claims on profits, dividends, or liquidation proceeds. Productive DeFi protocols share revenue through buybacks or token burns tied to protocol usage. Commodity-backed tokens are redeemable for underlying assets. DEUS has none of these as guaranteed mechanisms.
Planned (But Not Guaranteed) Value Mechanisms
The documentation mentions several potential ways value could flow to token holders, but all are discretionary.
The veToken Model (xDEUS), planned for Q4 2025, would allow users to lock DEUS to receive xDEUS (vote-escrowed DEUS), with promises of "enhanced governance power and eligibility for rewards." The critical issue: specific rewards are not contractually guaranteed and remain subject to future governance decisions. This is a promise to create a future mechanism, with no implementation yet.
The 5% SubDAO Fee is the closest thing to programmatic value. Each SubDAO launched via the Machine Economy Launchpad allocates 5% of its token supply to the XMAQUINA treasury. This does create value flow to the treasury, but distribution to DEUS holders still requires governance votes that entities aren't obligated to honor.
Token buybacks and burns are frequently mentioned but entirely discretionary. Marketing materials and third-party analyses reference buybacks as value accrual, yet Section 7j explicitly states tokens are "non-repurchasable." Any buybacks would be voluntary treasury actions with no binding obligation behind them.
Governance-voted distributions are the "trust us" mechanism. The community can vote to distribute treasury proceeds, but Section 7g clarifies that decisions are "not based on specific goals or risk tolerance of individual members." Without fiduciary duty, votes function as suggestions rather than binding directives.
The Only Enforceable Ways DEUS Can Increase in Value
The realistic paths to DEUS appreciation are limited. First, speculation: more buyers than sellers on secondary markets. Second, the team choosing voluntarily to implement distributions, at their discretion, with zero obligation. Third, governance premium: people paying for voting influence itself. None of these mechanisms are enforceable. None are hard-coded. None require the project's success to translate into token holder value.
Smart Contracts Are Not Publicly Available
A critical gap: XMAQUINA's smart contract code is not published on GitHub or other public repositories. While the DEUS token contract is deployed and audited by Hashlock, without public source code, independent verification of value distribution functions is impossible.
You cannot verify whether any programmatic mechanisms exist to enforce value sharing. You must trust the team's descriptions.
The Treasury Can Succeed While Tokens Fail
RWA Robotics LTD could generate successful exits from robotics investments while DEUS holders retain zero enforceable claim to those proceeds.
If the DAO invests in a robotics startup that 10xs, the equity appreciation belongs to RWA Robotics LTD and its shareholders. DEUS holders can vote that they'd like to see buybacks or distributions, but there's no mechanism forcing this to happen.
The "Trust Me Bro" Factor
The entire value proposition rests on the team voluntarily choosing to benefit token holders despite having no legal obligation to do so.
This is the antithesis of "code is law" crypto ethos. There are no smart contract-enforced mechanisms tying treasury performance to token value. There are no enforceable claims. It's pure trust in the team's goodwill.
Compare this to MakerDAO, where MKR holders earn fees from the protocol through mechanisms hard-coded into smart contracts. Or to traditional equity, where shareholders have legally enforceable claims on company assets. Or to real estate tokens, where tokens represent fractional ownership with legal backing. DEUS has the aesthetics of decentralization without the substance. The legal structure maintains centralized control while marketing decentralized participation.
Why This Matters: The Exit Liquidity Problem
If you're thinking "But couldn't I flip this for a profit at TGE?", consider the dynamics at play. Information asymmetry means most buyers won't read 40+ pages of Terms & Conditions. Marketing momentum could drive prices up initially. But the fundamentals are rotten: eventually, the disconnect between treasury performance and token value will become apparent.
The question isn't whether you can flip it. It's whether you want to be complicit in passing along an asset with fundamentally misleading economics to the next buyer.
This is how exit liquidity games work. Sophisticated early participants understand the structure and market the narrative ("robotics investment DAO!"). Later participants buy the narrative without reading the fine print. Early participants exit into that demand. And later participants are left holding governance rights to someone else's treasury.
The Meme Coin Reality (With Caveats)
Is DEUS a meme coin? Not technically. There's a real project, genuine robotics industry connections, regulatory engagement (UAE sandbox pilot, MI legal structure), and audited smart contracts. The team demonstrates more sophistication than pump-and-dump operations.
But economically, it functions in strikingly similar ways. Value depends primarily on narrative and community sentiment. No enforceable mechanism ties token value to underlying asset performance. Success or failure of robotics investments has no guaranteed correlation to token price. The "fundamentals" are marketing, governance influence, and future promises rather than cash flows or ownership claims. Token holders participate in upside through secondary market speculation rather than legal entitlement to profits.
The critical distinction: meme coins like Dogecoin are honest about what they are, operating as community-driven speculation with no pretense of underlying value. DEUS markets itself as an investment vehicle offering "ownership" and "stakes" in robotics companies, while legal documents explicitly disclaim these rights.[^1]
This makes it arguably more problematic than a meme coin: it has meme coin economics wrapped in investment vehicle marketing. At least meme coin buyers know they're gambling on community sentiment rather than expecting ownership claims.
The Industry Pattern
To be clear: this structure isn't unique to XMAQUINA. Many crypto projects employ similar architectures, offering governance tokens marketed with investment language while legal documents disclaim ownership rights. XMAQUINA exemplifies a troubling industry pattern. Legal entities retain centralized control while marketing decentralization. Governance theater provides participation without power. Investment terminology is explicitly defined as "analogy" in binding contracts. Discretionary value distribution depends on team goodwill rather than enforceable mechanisms.
The criticism applies broadly across the industry.
What I Got Wrong
I made several mistakes. First, I assumed the terms matched the marketing, taking the investment DAO narrative at face value. Second, I didn't read the Terms & Conditions before Genesis participation. The legal structure is clear; I just didn't review it carefully enough up front. Third, I confused governance with ownership. Voting rights feel valuable, but without enforceable economic claims, they're primarily symbolic. Fourth, I underestimated the complexity. The three-entity structure spanning multiple jurisdictions is more sophisticated than a simple cash grab.
The team hasn't hidden anything. It's all in the legal documents. But the documents directly contradict the narrative being marketed to potential buyers.
What XMAQUINA Got Right (For Fairness)
To maintain credibility, it's important to acknowledge where XMAQUINA demonstrates legitimate effort.
The legal structure shows genuine sophistication. The MI DAO LLC provides actual legal entity status with member limited liability protection, which is more advanced than projects with no legal wrapper. On the security front, smart contracts have been audited by Hashlock, suggesting attention to technical security even if economic rights are questionable. The team's regulatory engagement also stands out: the UAE regulatory sandbox pilot (planned Q1 2026) shows proactive compliance thinking rather than pure regulatory arbitrage.
Tokenomics are transparent, with a fixed 1 billion token supply, team tokens subject to 12.5% vesting with cliff and linear release schedule, and no infinite mint capabilities. Community engagement numbers are strong: 34,000+ Discord members, multiple successful auctions ($3M+ in under 20 minutes), and 48,000+ Twitter followers suggest genuine interest. Industry partnerships with PEAQ network, Virtual Protocol, and inclusion in established launchpad ecosystems indicate some legitimacy.
These factors don't change the fundamental economic structure, but they do distinguish XMAQUINA from pure scam projects. The team appears to believe in their vision. The question is whether the legal structure serves token holders' interests or primarily protects the controlling entities.
The Questions I Should Have Asked
Before participating, I should have demanded answers to these questions. Who are the shareholders of RWA Robotics LTD? What legally binding mechanisms guarantee that treasury performance benefits token holders? If RWA Robotics LTD liquidates with $100M in assets, how much do DEUS holders receive? (Answer: $0.) What prevents RWA Robotics LTD from operating the project successfully while leaving tokens worthless? (Answer: nothing.) Why is the legal structure a BVI company rather than a legally recognized DAO structure? (Answer: to maintain control while offering participation theater.)
The team's Q&A responses are telling. When asked "How does value get transferred to the DEUS token as assets within the DAO grow?", the answer was: "Value flows into the DEUS ecosystem as the DAO's treasury grows through machine operations, successful exits, launchpad participation, and SubDAO activity, which can then increase DEUS token utility and governance influence."
Notice the weasel words: "can then increase." Not "will increase," not "is programmatically distributed," but "can" increase, subject to the team's discretion.
Why I'm Still Selling Despite the Upside Case
Someone will argue: "But what if the team is honest? What if they do implement value return mechanisms? What if governance becomes genuinely valuable?"
These are all possible. But I don't invest based on hope and goodwill when legal structures protect against it. Even if they want to return value, there's no guarantee they can (regulatory pressure, legal disputes, team changes, etc.). The legal structure could have been designed to provide enforceable claims, and they chose otherwise. Precedent in crypto suggests teams optimize for themselves when legal structures permit it.
The risk/reward doesn't make sense when the structure explicitly protects the entity against having to share success with token holders.
The Broader Problem: DAO Theater
XMAQUINA exemplifies a troubling trend in crypto: DAO aesthetics without DAO substance.
Real decentralization means on-chain, transparent operations with programmatically enforced value accrual, legally recognized participant rights, and minimal trust requirements. XMAQUINA offers marketing of decentralization alongside a centralized legal entity owning everything, voluntary and discretionary value return, and maximum trust requirements.
This pattern is common. Many "DAOs" are actually companies with token-based suggestion boxes. But calling it what it is (centralized with community input) would be less marketable than claiming to be a "decentralized robotics investment DAO."
What Would Make DEUS a Sound Investment?
XMAQUINA has implemented some structural elements (MI non-profit DAO LLC, audited contracts, legal entity framework), but critical protections remain missing.
The non-profit DAO LLC exists but explicitly prohibits member distributions. A for-profit legal wrapper giving token holders actual ownership claims would be the first necessary change. Programmatic mechanisms that automatically distribute treasury appreciation to token holders are absent; the current system only collects fees that require governance votes to disburse. Legal frameworks binding the controlling entities to execute governance votes would replace the current advisory-only model. Public disclosure of who controls RWA Robotics LTD, the XMAQUINA Foundation, and the relationship between these entities and token holders is unavailable. A legal duty requiring entities to act in token holders' financial interests would replace the explicit disclaimer in Section 8f. Protection beyond the current $100 maximum liability would make legal recourse meaningful. Verifiable on-chain mechanisms would replace trust in proprietary systems. And redemption rights allowing token holders to claim their proportional share of treasury assets would mirror traditional investment fund structures.
The legal infrastructure exists, but it's configured to protect the entities and team rather than to create enforceable economic rights for token holders.
My Decision
I'm selling at TGE because the legal architecture doesn't support the investment thesis being marketed. Upside depends on voluntary team behavior while downside means zero enforceable claims. I'm uncomfortable holding an asset where the marketed value proposition doesn't match the legal reality. And capital deployed in DEUS could be in assets with clearer value accrual mechanisms.
This isn't a prediction that DEUS will fail. The team might be completely well-intentioned. The project might succeed spectacularly. Token price might even appreciate substantially.
But the legal structure means that success or failure is tangential to my interests as a token holder. I prefer to invest in assets where my interests are aligned and enforceable rather than dependent on goodwill and discretion.
For Those Still Holding
If you're staying in DEUS, ask yourself: Do you understand that you own governance rights rather than treasury assets? Are you comfortable that value return is voluntary rather than mandatory? Do you know who owns RWA Robotics LTD? Would you still hold if you knew the treasury could 10x while tokens remain flat? Are you investing or speculating?
There's nothing wrong with speculation if you're honest about it. But don't confuse narrative with structure, or governance with ownership.
Conclusion: Sophisticated Structure, Unchanged Economics
XMAQUINA represents a more complex case than initially apparent. The three-entity legal structure spanning the Caymans, MI, and BVI, combined with regulatory engagement and audited contracts, demonstrates sophistication beyond typical crypto projects.
But this complexity doesn't change the fundamental economic reality: DEUS token holders have governance influence without enforceable ownership claims.
The non-profit DAO LLC is structured to prohibit member distributions. The Terms & Conditions explicitly disclaim ownership, revenue rights, and fiduciary duties. Smart contracts aren't publicly verifiable. Governance votes are advisory rather than binding. The liability cap is $100.
Marketing materials promise "ownership," "stakes," and the ability to "co-own" robotics assets. Section 7j states tokens grant no ownership, securities, revenue rights, or participation of any kind. Section 20b defines investment language as "analogies" rather than literal claims.
This pattern isn't unique to XMAQUINA. It reflects an industry-wide tendency where projects want investment marketing without securities compliance. But that doesn't make it acceptable.
XMAQUINA has built sophisticated legal infrastructure to protect itself and maintain control while offering token holders participation theater. You can vote, but those votes aren't binding. Value may flow to you, but only at the discretion of entities that owe you no fiduciary duty. Success could benefit you, but only if the team voluntarily shares proceeds they're not obligated to distribute.
And that's why, despite the quality branding, genuine robotics connections, and apparent team conviction, I'll be selling at TGE.
In crypto, we champion "code is law." But XMAQUINA reminds us that sometimes, traditional legal structures (actual contracts governing actual entities controlling actual assets) matter more than the code.
And those documents tell a very different story than the marketing deck.
[^1]: Update (January 2026): After this analysis was published, XMAQUINA announced the "RCM Protocol" - a new system for creating tradeable SubDAO tokens representing "alignment" with specific robotics companies. The announcement explicitly cites Pump.fun (meme coin infrastructure) and Virtuals Protocol (AI agent speculation) as inspiration, and describes participation as "conviction-driven" and "belief coordination." The SubDAO token disclaimer mirrors the DEUS disclaimers: "SubDAO Tokens do not represent equity, ownership, or any legal claim on underlying assets. They confer no rights to dividends, governance, or redemption. Any value they accrue is entirely market-driven." All value mechanisms remain discretionary - fees "can be directed toward" buybacks and staking incentives, not "will be" or "must be." This development strengthens rather than weakens the central thesis of this analysis.
Update — February 2026: TGE delayed again, and the cap table question nobody can answer
The Token Generation Event has been postponed again. Current timeline puts it somewhere in summer 2026, which means those of us planning to exit remain DAO members indefinitely. My plans haven't changed — I'm selling at TGE whenever it actually happens.
But a recent exchange in the XMAQUINA Discord crystallized something I've been circling around since January. A member posted what should be the simplest question in the world:
"I am having trouble getting my non crypto friends excited about our DAO. They say everyone can say they own shares but I could not find a document where the DAO is on the cap table of the SPV. Is there such page?"
This is the question. Not "when moon," not "what's the token utility," but the basic due diligence question any serious investor would ask: show me the paper trail proving the DAO owns what you say it owns.
The response from the team was polished:
"We will share the partner who is doing these Attestations in our new documentation, which should go live late next week. What we will do, is add a third-party attestations that confirm the DAO's equity positions, and these will be surfaced directly in the DAO portal on the individual company pages. We're also exploring publishing these attestations onchain (e.g. via IPFS) so they're publicly viewable onchain with timestamps."
Read that carefully. The member asked for cap table documentation. The response pivots to attestations — a third party saying "yes, this is true." That's not the same thing as the underlying legal document. It's one layer of indirection away from the actual answer.
If the equity positions are already legally documented, you don't need a third party to attest to them. You show the documents. Attestations matter most when the underlying paperwork is complex, indirect, or hard for members to interpret — which, given the three-entity structure spanning the Caymans, MI, and BVI described in this piece, is exactly the situation here.
A few details worth noting:
"Exploring publishing these attestations onchain (e.g. via IPFS)" — "Exploring" is doing heavy lifting. Publishing a PDF to IPFS is trivial. If this were a priority, it would be done, not explored.
"Late next week" — Standard startup timeline language. The TGE was supposed to happen in Q4 2025. Then Q1 2026. Now summer. Timelines are aspirational.
Borderless Capital suggested it — Name-dropping an advisor to add credibility. Fine, but that's not a document.
The honest answer to "is the DAO on the cap table of the SPV?" is either yes (here it is) or no (not yet, here's why). Everything else is community management, however well-intentioned.
This exchange matters because it validates the central thesis of this analysis from a completely different angle. In January, I documented that Section 7j explicitly disclaims ownership rights, that Section 20b redefines "investment" as "fuzzy analogy," and that the legal structure maintains centralized control while marketing decentralized participation. The cap table question is the real-world manifestation of all that legal architecture. A member's non-crypto friends are asking the most basic question — do you actually own what they say you own? — and the answer, seven months after Genesis auctions that raised millions, is "we're working on attestations that should go live late next week."
If XMAQUINA delivers verifiable, legally grounded attestations with real cap table documentation published onchain, that would be a meaningful step for transparency — and I'll acknowledge it. But here's what attestations don't fix, even in the best case: they prove that an entity holds equity in robotics companies. They do not prove that you, as a DEUS token holder, have any enforceable claim on that equity.
This is the distinction the original analysis documented at length: the DAO is structured as a non-profit that explicitly prohibits member distributions. Section 7j says tokens grant no ownership, securities, or revenue rights. Section 8f disclaims fiduciary duty. The three-entity architecture means the equity sits inside RWA Robotics LTD or the XMAQUINA Foundation — entities that owe token holders nothing beyond delivering the token itself.
So even perfect attestations — onchain, timestamped, verified by a Big Four firm — would prove that someone else's entity owns equity in robotics companies. The member's non-crypto friends would still be right to ask: "OK, but what does that mean for you?"
Transparency about what the DAO holds is not the same as ownership of what the DAO holds. Attestations address the first problem. Nothing in the current legal structure addresses the second. Until that changes, the gap between marketing ("co-own robotics assets") and legal reality (governance rights to someone else's treasury) remains exactly as wide as it was when I wrote this piece.
Disclosure: I participated in DEUS Genesis auctions and will be selling my allocation at TGE. This analysis is based on publicly available documentation as of February 2026. XMAQUINA's structure may evolve. Always verify current terms. This is not financial advice. DYOR.
For source material review: